In this paper, I illustrate how phenomenology can bring greater clarity and precision to our folk concept of well-being. I introduce well-being as a phenomenological problem by explaining how (1) states of well-being must be individuated in terms of their invariant experiential structures before they can become targets of empirical description and explanation, and (2) the inherent normativity of occurrent states of well-being can be elucidated through phenomenological description. Moreover, I argue that well-being is not defined by the content of the experience; instead, it is a state that allows for the most unhindered expression of the invariant, autotelic structure of the self-constituting subject. I then show how it is at a phenomenological level of analysis that we can distinguish between distinct senses in which autotelic experience can carry normative weight. I conclude by giving a Husserl-inspired account of the intentional, temporal micro-structure of autotelic states that allows us to make a principled distinction between the distinct forms of autotelicity evinced in neutral exercises of skill and in actions that facilitate the cultivation of virtue.
